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- c. The Saar question appeared to Heinemann to portend difficulty for the French if the U.S.S.R. and Germany should insist on retaining this district; but he and Koch felt that the Saar appears to be a point more easily discussed with the French than the issue of a Germany remilitarized by the Americans.
3. Heinemann considered the suggestion of a national army to be a clever move by the Soviets, but pointed out that this issue will engender the most resistance on the part of the West, which could be expected to say that such a limited army would not be ready to hold off existing Soviet power behind the Oder-Neisse line. Heinemann feels that with U.S. forces moved to France and Belgium, the U.S. would really be out of Europe and forced to rely on bases on the other side of the Atlantic, while the U.S.S.R. has the possibility of moving quickly into Germany. Heinemann believes it important that the peace treaty contain a guarantee by the signatory powers, including Germany, on the inviolability of the territory established in the treaty. He believes such a declaration by the U.S.S.R. and other signatories would destroy any argument based on the ease with which the U.S.S.R. could attack Germany, and would give the young German state security of its borders.
 4. Heinemann asked the others for their opinions concerning the setting up of a German government which would be capable of signing a treaty with the big powers. Heinemann had intended to make a suggestion at the council session of the Evangelical Church that the Church or Bishop Otto Dibelius turn to the governments of East and West Germany urging a common consultation on the implementation of elections for a national assembly, and possibly making available the House of Bishops as a neutral meeting-place. Grueber, Nuschke, and Goetting rejected this idea and asked Heinemann to request from the council session that it turn to the people with a demand to test the U.S.S.R. suggestion carefully and to announce their readiness for talks on a German peace treaty.
 5. Heinemann mentioned the question of the U.N. commission, and suggested to Nuschke that the DDR allow the U.N. representatives to visit the DDR, and, at the same time, tie Bonn to supporting the implementation of free, secret, and democratic elections in all Germany. Goetting explained to Heinemann that the U.N. commission was organized by the United States and Adenauer to hinder the elections. Heinemann finally conceded the point after the others emphasized this line.
 6. To Heinemann's question about the formation of a government in Germany, Goetting, Nuschke, etc., mentioned the suggestion of the Weimar election law. This point was fully discussed between Heinemann and Nuschke, with the latter against the single united election district advocated by Heinemann. Discussion of this point was closed by Goetting and Toeplitz, who remarked that it is only of second rank compared to the more important issues of elections and a peace treaty.
 7. Heinemann mentioned the question of prisoners in the DDR, asking Nuschke about the possibility of an amnesty for political prisoners. Nuschke and Toeplitz referred to the fact that it has always been the West which has dramatized this point and used it in the political struggle between East and West. Nuschke brought out the cases of war criminals whose punishment was justified, although he stated that he has always interceded for those whose punishments he felt to be greater than their crime called for. Toeplitz emphasized the many cases which show that the "spy ministry" of Jacob Kaiser and groups such as the Kampfgruppe and Freiheitliche Juristen are attempting to turn DDR citizens against the state. Heinemann said he had spoken to Kaiser about this and the latter had denied giving money for such purposes.
 8. The talk concluded in agreement to gather all possible forces for the demand for a peace treaty.

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